Catherine Bragg, former Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator and Deputy Head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), said international humanitarian aid is no longer governed by a monolitic authoritative, formal humanitarian system, but now involves a multitude of actors including regional organizations who are developing their own coordination mechanisms and member states who are developing their own capabilities and structures.

She said one of the most  positive developments in humanitarian affairs over the past five years is that middle-income countries have increased their capacity to coordinate and respond to disasters within their jurisdiction.

“I think that what we need to do is to accept that OCHA is not going to be the only coordinating body for international humanitarian affairs in the future," Ms. Bragg said.

She also said there is no longer one authoritative information source."You try to have access as much as possible from different information systems," she said.

But with this expanded system comes challenges in coordinating aid efforts. “How do we make sure that we can still all aim towards the same humanitarian objectives and not trip over each other or [over] the things that coordination is about?” she said. “What I have come to realize is that we need to establish a kind of common norms and standards between the different types of actors when we are parading in the same theater and towards the same humanitarian objectives.”

Ms. Bragg said that different kinds of aid are being instrumentalized and have different objectives, but "we need to have a distinctive form of aid that is purely about saving lives and alleviating acute human suffering. And that distinctive form of aid has to be neutral and non-instrumentalized and as impartial as possible.” 

“Now, the fact that we fall short of all of these ideals in a lot of instances does not mean that they don’t matter; it just means, that as all human endeavor, we can’t be perfect. And we should strive to be perfect, and strive for that ideal."

The interview was conducted by Jérémie Labbé, Senior Policy Analyst, International Peace Institute.

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Transcript:

Jérémie Labbé: I am here today with Catherine Bragg, former Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator and Deputy Head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. You held this position from late 2007 to early 2013. Catherine, thank you very much for joining us at the Global Observatory today. 

Let me ask you first a fairly broad question to start with. What are the three or four most positive changes that you witnessed within the humanitarian system during the five years that you spent in your former position? 

Catherine Bragg: I think that's a very, very good question, and as I leave my former position, I did spend some time thinking about just what have been the changes in the system itself. I think that the first thing I would mention is our collective attempt to be more inclusive over the course of the last five years. For example, by about 2008-09, the number of projects by NGOs in the consolidated appeal surpassed 50%, and I think that was a very good sign. If you recall that in the beginning, 20 years ago when we first started, the numbers of NGO projects were roughly about 10%. So, I think that is a very good trend. 

And also, I think that increasingly, member states are getting involved in the humanitarian system as well. A good example is the CERF, the Center Emergency Response Fund, currently is being contributed to by 126 countries out of 193 members of the UN. That's an exceedingly high level of participation. And we are also seeing more and more member states interested in contributing to pool funds and also contributing to the consolidated appeals as well. So, I think that those are all good signs of inclusivity; we can certainly all do more. 

With the adoption of the new Arms Trade Treaty and the G8 Declaration on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict, the international community has taken major steps towards creating an international framework of deterrence for sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict. Even more striking is that collectively, these international efforts mark a tipping point in the lifespan of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325), reflecting the precedence of new norms and “soft-laws” that connect the women, peace, and security agenda to international humanitarian law. Applying UNSCR 1325 and a gender perspective to international humanitarian law (IHL) represents a new and innovative area of practice with the promise of identifying new strategies and entry points in the protection of civilians in international and non-international armed conflict.  

Unlike treaties and international policy statements in the past, both the new Arms Trade Treaty and the G8 Declaration make direct reference to UNSCR 1325, the gendered dimensions of armed conflict, and how this impacts the execution and interpretation of international humanitarian law. While the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols have always referenced the fact that international humanitarian law is based on “equality of protection,” it is now widely accepted that situations of armed conflict will inevitably impact men and women unequally. These recent developments call for understanding how the different experiences of men and women in armed conflict impact state’s obligations outlined in the laws of war.

Key Conclusions

While both the Arms Trade Treaty and the G8 Declaration can be criticized for being weak in holding member states accountable for preventing and prosecuting acts of gender-based violence, the adoption of these measures is an advancement for UNSCR 1325 because it crystalizes the relationship between the gendered dimensions of armed conflict and international humanitarian law in three key areas: prevention of violations of IHL, means of warfare, and prosecution of grave breaches. 

• Prevention: Ignorance of the law significantly deters efforts to regulate the behavior of parties to a conflict. Therefore, state parties to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are obligated to teach and train military forces in IHL. The G8 Declaration which states “the training of national and international police and security will…receive appropriate training to approach and deal effectively with rape and sexual violence,” demonstrates increasing respect for and political will to comply with the provisions of IHL. Similarly, UNSCR 1325 calls for gender training of international peacekeeping forces.
• Means of Warfare: Article 36 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention requires the review of new weapons, and means and methods of warfare. In a groundbreaking move, article (7) of the Arms Trade Treaty requires sellers of arms to consider how their weapons will be used and to make that information public in a “risk assessment process.” The treaty specifically calls for sales to be evaluated on whether the weapons will be used to break humanitarian law, foment genocide or war crimes—including the systemic use of sexual violence against women and children in armed conflict. The full and equal participation of women and women’s organizations in this review process is mandated by UNSCR 1325’s call for the inclusion of women in matters of international security and peace.
• Prosecution: The G8 Declaration’s statement that “rape and sexual violence in conflict are going to be recognized as a breach of the Geneva Convention,” is an expression of newly found political will to address the issue of sexual violence in conflict. Jurisprudence from the international criminal ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda already confirmed that rape and other forms of sexual violence constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, and are considered war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in certain circumstances. In addition, customary IHL rule 93 states that rape and other forms of sexual violence are expressly prohibited. 

However, the fact that the G8 Declaration so clearly reaffirms that rape is a grave breach of IHL at a high political level, and requests specific training and funding for prosecution of these crimes, is new and promising. The G8 Declaration states, “Preventing sexual violence in armed conflict is a matter of maintaining international security in keeping with UN Security Council Resolution 1820.”

Half a million people die violently each year from interpersonal violence, organized crime, and civil wars. Not only do premature deaths result in productivity losses and inconsolable pain and suffering, they represent a drag on economic growth. In the fragile societies where most violence occurs, the development trajectories of the families and dependents of those killed will be permanently set back, having lost fathers, mothers, siblings, breadwinners, and entrepreneurs. And alongside these fatalities are tens of millions more who suffer violent assaults, non-fatal injuries, and displacement, who will lose their property, assets, and investments.

Though the global debate around the post-2015 development agenda testifies to the way in which the concept of development itself is fundamentally deepening, the place of conflict and fragility in the agenda remains in question. For the past two years, these issues have preoccupied thousands of diplomats, activists, and practitioners. Their concerns were given voice most recently during United Nations-supported consultations in Monrovia, Panama, Jakarta and Helsinki. Routinely highlighted at these meetings was the fundamental place of “peace,” whether conceived narrowly as the absence of violence or described in broad terms as real and perceived safety and security. 

There are signs that policy circles are recognizing these relationships between security and development. In fact, the United Nations Secretary-General has declared that the transformation of “violent conflicts and fragility into peace, justice and shared prosperity” must be a cornerstone of the post-2015 agenda. It is worth recalling that this is not an entirely new insight. In fact, the Millennium Declaration, which gave rise to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) affirmed the world’s commitment to peace, freedom from fear, and development challenges associated with violence.

Hugo Slim, a former aid worker and leading humanitarian academic, said in this interview that he believes humanitarian agencies can disregard state consent in pursuit of accessing populations in need of assistance, as in the case of Syria. “It seems ethically acceptable to me at that point; if a government is not accepting more humanitarian agencies, for humanitarian agencies to go cross-border in such a situation,” he said.

Mr Slim said that, in terms of  international law, it is clear "that we live in a world of law which recognizes the rights of individuals and not just the rights of states. Therefore, these people who are not being reached by the cross-line operations have a place in international relations; they need to be reached. The law is not to just cover states—the law is for the peoples in those states."

On the question of impartiality, one of the three principles of humanitarian action, Mr. Slim said, “I’ve never worked in a situation where I felt, ‘Oh great, everything is fine, we are being completely impartial.’ It doesn’t exist, because humanitarian action is always a struggle for access, a struggle for those values in wars which are competing over other values. So, you never get complete impartiality, but you have to aim at it, and you have to say it’s what you want and what you think is right.”

Mr. Slim said he believes the value that humans place on all human life is sometimes overridden because, “it’s not the only thing we feel as human beings, because sometimes we absolutely hate each other, sometimes we feel deeply frightened of one another, sometimes we feel deeply threatened.”

“And sometimes—very often in war this happens, but I have no doubt that the essential feeling of the value of the human life, of the sadness of the human death is universal, and that’s why it is a global agenda.”

The interview was conducted by Jérémie Labbé, Senior Policy Analyst, International Peace Institute.

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Transcript:

Jérémie Labbé: I am here today with Dr. Hugo Slim, former aid worker and leading humanitarian academic, who published numerous articles and books on the practice, politics, and ethics of humanitarian aid and on protection of civilians. Hugo, thanks for joining us today on the Global Observatory. 

First: what is your take on the debate between cross-border and cross-line humanitarian assistance in Syria that created much discussion lately within humanitarian circle? To give some background to our listeners, this debate is about how best to deliver aid to populations in rebel-controlled areas. Some aid agencies recently denounced the imbalances of humanitarian assistance that would go mainly to government areas and call for stepping up humanitarian operations across borders in opposition controlled areas, despite objections from the Syrian government. Can humanitarian actors afford to disregard the requirement of state consent which is central to the existing normative humanitarian framework? 

Hugo Slim: I think they can. I don’t have a problem with cross-border humanitarian action, and I don’t think humanitarian agencies traditionally have a problem with cross-border humanitarian action. 

But you have to do it for good reason, and it has to be ethically, and in a way, legally legitimate. In this case, my understanding is that for several months—now years—a wide variety of humanitarian agencies have offered aid to the Syrian government to work with the Syrian government on that side had been refused. At the same time, it’s quite clear that the passage of humanitarian aid to all parts of Syria has been deeply problematic, as it often is in war. And therefore, there are large parts that are uncovered still and unreached on a regular basis, while the war is still very hot. So, it seems ethically acceptable to me at that point; if a government is not accepting more humanitarian agencies, for humanitarian agencies to go cross-border in such a situation.

JL: You say it is ethically possible, or maybe even ethically compulsory, for some of these aid agencies to go cross-border. But can they legally do that, given the existing legal framework for humanitarian action?

HS: Well, my view is that international humanitarian law makes it clear that aid is acceptable from a humanitarian, and neutral, impartial humanitarian organization. So, all agencies have an obligation under law to be neutral, and impartial, and humanitarian that they must do if they are working anywhere, but especially if they are working cross-border. In terms of international law, for me as well, it's also quite now that we live in a world of law which recognizes the rights of individuals and not just the rights of states. Therefore, these people who are not being reached by the cross-line operations have a place in international relations; they need to be reached, the law is not to just cover states, the law is for the peoples in those states. 

Human Rights Watch’s latest report “Death From the Skies” on atrocities in Syria covers the aerial attacks perpetrated by the Syrian security forces. Since these started in July 2012, they have only intensified to a disastrous effect on the Syrian people, killing at least 4,300 civilians, according to a source it quotes. In the report, 59 specific aggressions are documented, among them repeated—and therefore deliberate—attacks on hospitals and bakeries, which, under the current circumstances in the country, are two key institutions keeping war-torn areas from a complete societal breakdown. They also record the indiscriminate use of force, including cluster munitions and incendiary bombs in densely populated areas, providing the hard data behind the widely circulated images of streets lined by rows of buildings turned to rubble. 

What makes this situation more desperate, however, are the obstacles that international parties concerned with the conflict in Syria, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), face in acting, if not to solve, to at least alleviate the conflict. Since protests and their repression—the latter unstoppably fuelling the former—started in earnest in early 2011, HRW has gone to great lengths to cover the terrible bloodshed in Syria: the New York-based organization has produced seven reports and dozens of press releases denouncing the atrocities. Perhaps reflecting a sense of helplessness and pessimism shared by all parties involved, the pace of production seems to have slowed down somewhat; nine months have passed since their previous report, “Torture Archipelago.” This is possibly the result of the fact that they cannot say things more clearly or loudly than they have already; the horror hasn’t stopped—if anything it has intensified—and there is little that is new about it. 

There are serious and mounting challenges to covering Syria. Other than the high levels of violence, HRW is actually banned from the country by the regime. HRW is quite open about this specific—and quite fundamental—constraint, which limits its fieldwork to the rebel-controlled areas. In the press release presenting “Death from the Skies,” they state clearly that “Human Rights Watch was able to visit only sites in opposition-controlled areas in northern Syria because the government has denied Human Rights Watch access to the rest of the country.” One consequence of this ban is that HRW’s capacity to document the atrocities carried out by the rebels is severely curtailed. 

Another important omission—central to the current debate over Syria at the UN, and again a reflection of the paralysis afflicting external actors in this conflict—is that the report mentions nothing about the use of chemical weapons. Their use by the Syrian regime is the red line drawn by President Obama that would be a game changer, potentially provoking the US to intervene, and so recent allegations have caused a great deal of tension among members of the Security Council, with Russia being particularly sensitive to any discussion of the issue. After the Western participation in the war in Libya, which it interpreted as an abuse of the Security Council resolution that sanctioned it, Russia has consistently and staunchly opposed any military intervention in Syria.

Indeed, some at the UN argue that the sequence of events in Libya, hailed as the most palpable example of the “responsibility-to-protect” doctrine—otherwise known as R2P—is actually the nail in the coffin of this concept, given that Russia will never again allow a similar resolution to pass at the Security Council. The “Libya model” is nevertheless still being pushed by those trying to precipitate a more forceful intervention in Syria, which in turn provokes a heated debate as to the differences and similarities between the two. 

United Nations sanctions and acts of deterrence have not worked to end the cyclical crises that have plagued the Korean Peninsula since the end of the Korean War in 1953, according to Charles K. Armstrong, Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Studies and Director of the Center for Korean Research at Columbia University.

“The only realistic way out,” said Armstrong in an interview with the Global Observatory, “is to go back to negotiations, particularly between the US and North Korea.” 

 “Our immediate goal should be to de-escalate the current conflict on all sides, then to freeze North Korea’s nuclear program as it is through a negotiated process,” said Armstrong, pointing out that the North Koreans have frozen their nuclear program in the past—in 1994 and again in 2007. 

Over the long term, however, he noted that all sides, including—until recently—North Korea, have said that they want a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. “If we can eventually build trust between North and South, between North Korea and its other neighbors, then maybe we can work toward that goal.”

While the chance of a large-scale attack by North Korea on South Korean or American targets remains very slim, a number of elements have converged that make the current crisis especially acute, according to Armstrong, including the anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung, founder of the North Korean state.

In this context, a show of military force—such as the recent joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States—risks increasing tensions and producing a miscalculation that could lead to open conflict. Given the nuclear stakes, this “would be a catastrophe for not only North Korea and South Korea but the entire region,” said Armstrong. “A second Korean war could be very short, but it could kill millions of people, so that is something we want to avoid.”

While China and the US both have an interest in maintaining the broader status quo in the region, a negotiated process could lead to a scaling back of arms in the long term. Now that Kim Il-sung’s anniversary has passed and US Secretary of State John Kerry has opened the door to talks, negotiations look like a more realistic, as well as a potentially more effective, path. 

The interview was conducted by Marie O'Reilly, Associate Editor, International Peace Institute.

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Transcript:

Marie O’Reilly: Following a rocket launch in December and a third nuclear test in February, the North Korean leadership has been increasing its blustery rhetoric over the past two months—threatening a nuclear attack on the US and declaring a “state of war” with South Korea. What does the North Korean regime want, and how likely is a large-scale attack?

Charles Armstrong: I don’t think there is much chance, if any, of a large-scale, unprovoked attack by North Korea on the South or on American targets. In some ways this is the same story we have heard many times before. This seems to be a little bit different in terms of the level of rhetoric, the specificity of the threats, and also the duration of this really provocative language—it’s been going on now for about two months. But fundamentally, it’s the game that North Korea has played over and over again. 

If you look closely at the language, the North Koreans are not talking about attacking out of the blue for the most part. What they are trying to say is that they will defend themselves by any means necessary: if they are attacked, they will counterattack with full force. And they are trying to impress upon the world, and the US in particular, that they have greater capability than in the past to really inflict damage. They have demonstrated they have nuclear weapons, that they have missiles that can reach some distance, and that they will not be a force to be trifled with—that they can wreak tremendous damage on anyone whom they see as threatening, or who attacks them. 

The North Korean leadership has a number of goals, not so much to impress the outside world, but for their own purposes, for their own propaganda, if you will, for their own people—to prove that the new leader, Kim Jong-un, is an adequately tough and military-minded leader of the regime. 

Lina Attalah, chief editor of Egypt Independent, said President Mohamed Morsi's government seeks only to hold power and Egyptians are dreading the possibility of a return to pre-revolutionary times. “The current regime’s aspirations are limited to keeping the power that they have reaped through the electoral process as much as possible.” She said there is no conversation between the government and stakeholders, and that the troubled state of the country “gives us a sense of lack of strategy from the current regime to basically find durable political and economic solutions to the country.”

Ms. Attalah said Egyptians remain wary of the $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) currently being negotiated by the government. “People’s perception of the IMF loan is that this is the loan that will lead to very critical austerity measures that are unprecedented even in pre-revolutionary times, that will lead to very aggressive taxation, for which the poor will have to pay most of the price," she said, adding, "And it will also mean the removal of critical subsidies on very critical commodities.”

She said there is wide recognition that the economic problems need to be solved, but “if you are building a whole platform of economic reform solely based on trying to bridge this budget deficit, I am afraid this is not going to solve the problem.” 

Ms. Attalah also discussed the current media landscape, including Bassam Youssef’s arrest and what it means for freedom of the press, and her relatively new newspaper owned by businessmen but run by journalists keen on identifying themselves as “young.” 

“Young not in the sense of “young and foolish,” or “young and innocent,” and not all that cynical. But young in the sense that we are ready to always challenge already established conceptions of everything around us. And this is the possibility that is not there amongst the elderly, who, unfortunately, rely so much on what they already know, and are less interested in exploring new possibilities. I think this is where our forté lies.”

The interview was conducted by Nur Laiq, Senior Policy Analyst at the International Peace Institute.

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Transcript:

Nur Laiq: This is an IPI interview with Lina Attalah, the chief editor of Egypt Independent, on the situation in Egypt today. Before she joined Egypt Independent, Lina worked for Reuters, Cairo Times, The Daily Star, and The Christian Science Monitor. And before that, she worked as a radio producer and campaign coordinator with the BBC World Service Trust in Darfur, Sudan. 

Egypt is going through a rocky period right now, with instability and turmoil both in the political and economic spheres. The government cannot govern; the opposition doesn’t seem to oppose; and the gap between the people and the state is growing wider. 

As a journalist, you have access to all sides. To start off with the political situations right now: the unfortunate sectarian tragedy last week left 7 people dead and has been read as a microcosm of the chaos permeating the Egyptian political scene. Can you comment on the wide implications of that, and what’s happening in the transition in terms of the politics of the government, the opposition, and the street?

Lina Attalah: The sectarian violence that happened again last week falls into a wider context of sectarian clashes that have been common in Egypt for decades, but that have also intensified in the last decade, and particularly in the last few years. 

The sectarian tensions reflect deep societal problems pertaining to people—sentiments towards people’s differences, and so on—but they also give a face to how efficient or inefficient the political management of the crisis is. 

In the past, the political management of the crisis by the former regime of President Hosni Mubarak has been completely failing at finding durable solutions to the problem of sectarian violence, and this was reflected at the discursive levels. So for example, the regime would not admit that there is a societal problem, it would always externalize the problem by saying that these are outside forces who are basically trying to destabilize the country by engaging in these acts of violence, on a judicial level by not bringing anyone to justice, any of the perpetrators of these attacks to justice. 

In its latest attempt to raise war fever on the peninsula, North Korea has asked foreign embassy personnel to consider evacuating. But the North’s overheated rhetoric is obscuring a real threat posed by its nuclear and missile potential. Its nuclear test on February 12 showed it is on the way to perfecting a compact weapon capable of being mounted on a missile. It now says it will restart its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon to generate plutonium, and will continue enriching uranium for weapons. And it may be moving to test-launch a new missile capable of reaching Japan or possibly Guam.

The nuclear test set off renewed talk in Seoul and Tokyo about nuclear arming of their own, prompting Washington to try to reassure its allies through deterrence. Yet, doing so has done little to make Korea or the region more secure. 

Key Conclusions

• Deterrence alone will not bring calm to the peninsula. The way to reduce the risk of further clashes is a peace process in Korea in parallel with renewed negotiations to rein in the North’s nuclear and missile programs.
• No amount of disclaimers from Washington will persuade Beijing that the US military rebalancing to Asia is not aimed at containing it. Washington needs to accompany this with a political and diplomatic rebalancing toward China, and encourage its allies to do the same.
• A sustained effort at rapprochement could include bilateral discussions of urgent security issues, among them addressing the two states’ mutual vulnerability through mutual restraint in the domains of cyberspace, nuclear weaponry, and space.

Analysis

After China cooperated with the United States last month to draft a UN Security Council resolution tightening sanctions, the North did what it always does when Washington and Beijing work in concert: it tries to provoke their discordant reaction by raising tensions. 

When Beijing moves to calm Pyongyang, many in Washington criticize the unwillingness to bring the North to its knees as evidence of Beijing’s duplicity. Yet, antagonizing Beijing will only deepen insecurity in Northeast Asia, not put more pressure on Pyongyang.

The threats from Pyongyang also came in response to a military exercise by Washington and Seoul; one that, unlike those in previous years, included practice bombing runs by B-52 and B-2 bombers. The North Korean threats all seemed intent on underscoring deterrence of its own  and are explicitly predicated on prior action by the United States or South Korea. But its rhetorical deterrence is no match for the real military advantages that Seoul has on land, at sea, and in the air.

The danger is that as armed forces on both sides conduct exercises, the rhetoric can have unintended consequences if it leads them to shoot first and ask questions later.