In this interview, Martin Kobler, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and the Head of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), said that decades of UN Security Council sanctions imposed on Iraq created a negative impression of the institution among Iraqis, but that is changing. He said the deaths of 24 UN staff members, including the then-SRSG, in Baghdad in 2003 was a turning point. “I think this paved the way to an image of a new UN,” he said.

One problem for the UN in Iraq is making itself known. “Whenever I am at checkpoints, and we are asked where we are from, we say, ‘We are from the UN,’ and then people at the checkpoints tend to answer, ‘Oh yes, from the US.’”

Mr. Kobler discussed what UNAMI is doing in Iraq to assist the Iraqi government and help the Iraqi people, particularly in the areas of youth and environment.

“Fifty percent of the country is below the age of 18,” he said. However, most Iraqi youth are seeking to go abroad, causing “brain drain.”

Part of why they choose to leave is because they fear the existing terrorist threats. “Every day, 10 to 15 people still die on the streets of Baghdad,” he said.

Another reason is a lack of job opportunities. “There is not a good investment climate in the country. There is no private enterprise there which could bring the country ahead,” he said. A bad education system, with universities teaching curricula that date back to the 1980s, and rampant corruption in the public sector’s job market also discourage youth, he added.

“My appeal is to the government: give private companies more space, reduce red tape, reduce bureaucracy, have a one-stop shop for investors… These are framework conditions the government has to create in order to stop the brain drain,” he explained.

Mr. Kobler, who had just come from a sand-storm conference arranged by UNEP and the Kuwaiti Ministry of Environment, also hoped to bring environmental issues onto UNAMI’s political agenda.

In Iraq, the number of sand and dust storms has doubled in the past five years, partly due to climate change, and party due to environmental degradation.

“The practical idea is, together with UNEP in Nairobi, to create, with real money, huge green belts from Anbar province at the border of Jordan, down to Karbala, and down to the Kuwaiti border,” he said.

“I think it’s very important for the future generation, and one has to tackle it now,” he added.

The interview was conducted by Warren Hoge, IPI Senior Adviser for External Relations.

Listen to interview (or download mp3):

Warren Hoge: Our guest today in the Global Observatory is Martin Kobler, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and Head of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, known as UNAMI. He has been in this job since August of last year.

There is undoubtedly a need for a political solution to the ongoing crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which recently reached new depths with the fall of Goma. Yet viable solutions to intricate, multilayered conflict dynamics are difficult to reach when one party—in this case, the Congolese government—is brought to its knees following humiliating military defeats. The probability of a sustainable compromise that will reduce violence in the Kivus is difficult to envisage in the face of an insurgency led by skilled military entrepreneurs who have crucial military and diplomatic backing from neighboring countries. Certainly, the M23 has advanced some legitimate claims that are shared by both the Tutsi minority they claim to represent and wider layers of the population tired of the Kabila government’s inept governance. However, it is unlikely that its leaders, given their current military advantage, will accept any deal which does not reward their ambitions. In sum, the rebel takeover of Goma has decreased the possibility to break with a vicious cycle in which insurgent violence is time and again politically rewarded.

The responsibility of the "international community" in relation to the current events is multifaceted. It is not the least reflected in the inconsistent policies towards Rwanda, which have allowed the M23 to build up its military capacities unhindered. But in the context of the current bashing of the Congolese army (FARDC), it is important to point out that the "international community" also bears a responsibility for the failures of this military. The battle for North Kivu’s capital Goma on September 20, 2012 was not only a historic event in itself; it was also a test case for the effectiveness of donor policies vis-à-vis the DRC’s security sector, and stabilization more broadly. While the M23’s taking of the town was certainly a defeat for the FARDC, it has also shown the bankruptcy of donors’ military reform policies and the military cooperation between the FARDC and the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, MONUSCO.

An ostrich policy towards flawed military integration

According to some, the 2009 rapid integration of the CNDP rebel group in the FARDC (described here in more detail) was doomed to fail. Given that the Rwanda-backed CNDP was integrated from a position of strength, and could impose the terms of the agreement, so this argument goes, it was predestined to become "an army within an army" and to continue the power struggle within, instead of against, the FARDC. This was all the more so as Rwanda would not tolerate any weakening of the power networks through which it exercised influence over the Kivus.

On November 22, the flag of Mongolia was raised outside the Hofburg palace in Vienna where the negotiating and decision-making bodies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) meet. This event recognized the fact that Mongolia has become the 57th country to join the OSCE (the first new member since Montenegro in 2006). The accession process was complicated due to issues concerning how existing OSCE commitments should be applied to a country that is outside the zone of application of, for example, current arms control agreements. There were also concerns about the precedent that Mongolia’s accession would set for other countries that were not part of the original Helsinki process of the 1970s. Nevertheless, with OSCE foreign ministers due to meet in Dublin on December 6-7, the decision to welcome Mongolia strengthens the OSCE’s credentials to be the most inclusive and comprehensive regional security organization in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area.

Key Conclusions

Mongolia’s full participation in the OSCE is good for Mongolia and it is good for the OSCE. It demonstrates that the OSCE is still an organization that countries want to be part of, and it strengthens the organization’s profile as a Eurasian and not only a Euro-Atlantic body. For Mongolia, becoming an OSCE participating state opens up new possibilities and partnerships which is consistent with its “third neighbor” policy of building closer ties with partners other than its big neighbors Russia and China. Nevertheless, the decision to welcome Mongolia into the OSCE highlights the ambiguity of the boundaries of the OSCE area and the vagaries of the criteria for becoming an OSCE participating state. If Mongolia can join, why not Afghanistan (which is part of Eurasia), or countries of North Africa and the Middle East (which are much closer to Europe)? Where, and on what basis, will the line be drawn?  This issue needs to be resolved.

Analysis

Mongolia has been an OSCE Asian Partner for Cooperation since 2004. In October 2011, the minister for foreign affairs and trade of Mongolia, Gombojav Zandanshatar, formally expressed his country’s interest to become an OSCE participating state and to accept all commitments and responsibilities contained in OSCE documents. It was too early to welcome Mongolia into the OSCE family at the Vilnius ministerial meeting in December 2011, but at that meeting there was at least a clear signal that Ulaanbaatar’s request enjoyed strong support.

“I can almost guarantee you that when the Arab spring seeped into Syria in March 2011, that Bashar and the ruling circle were absolutely shocked,” said David Lesch, author of a new book on Syria, in this interview. “Bashar had commissioned three separate reports from his national security apparatus early in the year on whether or not the Arab Spring would seep into Syria, and all three said no.”

Mr. Lesch, who developed a close relationship with Syria's President Bashar al-Assad in the mid-2000s, said that the Syrian president believes his brutal actions are part of an effort to save Syria. He also said that the West had an unrealistic view of Assad as a reformer. "I think that from the very beginning, the expectations of Bashar were probably too high," he said.

On the question of why Russia doesn’t offer al-Assad asylum, Mr. Lesch said he would not accept an offer from Russia, “which is exactly why I think the Russians will not offer it to him, because Putin, who has positioned himself as the supposed go-to guy in terms of delivering Bashar al-Assad to the table, is, I think, fearful that if he’s actually asked to do so, that Bashar won’t comply, and therefore Putin looks powerless.”

Mr. Lesch said he is very skeptical of the new opposition group that was recently recognized by Britain, France, Turkey, and several Arab countries. “Perhaps it’s just the cynicism in me born by watching the failure of many such attempts to date since the uprising began, particularly the Syrian National Council, which was in many ways quite a failure.” He said the position taken by the United States is right: “Before they formally recognize it as the representative of the Syrian people, we have to see them in action–and actually, will it stay together?”

The interview was conducted by Warren Hoge, Senior Advisor for External Relations, International Peace Institute.

Listen to interview (or download mp3):

Warren Hoge: Our guest today in the Global Observatory is David Lesch, Professor of Middle East History at Trinity University at San Antonio, Texas. He is the author of a new book called Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad. It’s something of an inside account, because over the years, David has become the Western scholar who best knows Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian President. He has traveled to Syria more than 20 times, since his first trip there in 1989, on visits that sometimes last months, and he’s observed, close-up, the transformation of Bashar from a bearer of hope to a reactionary tyrant responsible for terrorizing his own people.

A few years ago it was fashionable to describe some of the world’s badlands as “ungoverned spaces.” Yet these areas outside the control of the central government—for example, in Afghanistan or Somalia—are not lawless. They are usually controlled by de facto authorities who may be better armed and better organized than the state that they have broken away from. In her new book Warlords, Kimberly Marten introduces us to these strong-arm brokers in weak states, particularly Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Georgia, Iraq, and Chechnya. She concludes with a number of lessons and hypotheses about warlords and sovereignty.

As the saying goes, nature abhors a vacuum. So do weak states. Where the central government is unable or unwilling to exercise its sovereignty, others will fill the void.

Marten, quoting historian David Herrmann, believes that “warlordism is the default condition of humanity.” She argues that “potential specialists in violence are always amongst us,” and, given the chance, they will take control over a specific territory using force and patronage. This is easier to do in failing states because there is less resistance. As a result, the state loses its monopoly on the use of force. 

Yet, as Marten points out, there may be times when states tolerate or even encourage warlords. In some cases (like Georgia’s relations with Abkhazia in the early 1990s), the central government made a virtue out of necessity because it could not defeat the warlord, so it struck a bargain with him. The British tried to do this with the Pashtun tribes on either side of the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the mid-19th century. As they discovered, the problem is that tribal leaders can be as manipulative as their patrons. In other cases, like Russia’s support for Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya or Pakistan’s relations with tribal leaders in the FATA, the state outsourced a piece of its sovereignty in a remote and/or hard to control territory to someone that it hoped it could work with. Under this Faustian bargain, she wrote, “as long as de jure sovereignty was preserved, de facto control over the territory was ceded.”

It is worth noting–although Marten does not raise the point–that international organizations operating in weak states have also made deals with warlords for the sake of short-term expediency. However, as Marten points out, such deals seldom appease warlords; rather they empower them. Furthermore, the longer warlords hold on to power, the stronger they become, and the harder it is to get rid of them. As she warns, “tolerating warlordism means accepting a future of political backwardness and illiberalism, and all of its potential economic and security consequences.”

Roger Nash’s academic work has focused on human rights and the UN field presence in conflict, and he is the co-author of a new report based on a two-year global research study for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

In this interview, Mr. Nash said that, for effectiveness, being in the field is “a whole other ball game," saying it allows for meetings with different key actors such as human rights activists and police who may be committing abuses. "You don’t just get to talk to the high-level people; it’s not just broadcast on the international stage," he said.  "You have a hundred more opportunities to influence people."

Mr. Nash said that the UN has “normally been a big asset” and that UN field presences “should very much keep in mind their particular added value as the UN, and that means that they have a particular profile, and ability to say things safely that maybe others don’t have.” Though he also said that some member states see the UN as associated with certain political interests, especially when the mission is integrated with a military component.

One of the recommendations that came out of the report was for the UN human rights presence to grow. “We think that the work is very effective—particularly cost effective—and we recommend more of them, that it happens in more countries, that there’s greater number of people, more human rights officers working in more countries, because that’s the way they’re going to have more impact,” he said.

The interview was conducted by Warren Hoge, IPI Senior Adviser for External Relations.

Listen to interview (or download mp3):

Warren Hoge: Roger Nash of Fieldview Solutions is the co-author of a new report from a two-year global research study for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The report is entitled “Influence on the Ground: Understanding and Strengthening the Protection Impact of United Nations Human Rights Field Presences,” and Roger is here in the Global Observatory today to walk us through it.

“Assuming the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU is indeed a great challenge for Cyprus, but also a great opportunity for any member state undertaking this obligation,” said Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis in this interview with IPI’s Walter Kemp, conducted via email.

In answering questions about the stalled negotiation process with Turkey over settlements and the influx of Turkish settlers, Ms. Kozakou-Marcoullis said, “Restarting the process requires that Turkey and the leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community, Mr. [Derviş] Eroğlu, return immediately to the negotiating table… without preconditions and ultimatums.” Addressing the settlements directly, she said, “Turkey’s colonization policy must be stopped, and its tragic results reversed.”

“We are anxious to find a solution of the Cyprus problem that would put an end to the occupation and the anachronistic division of the island and its people,” she said.

Ms. Kozakou-Marcoullis also answered questions about the Eurozone and the significance of the discovery of a major gas field, and what that means for Cyprus’s relations with its neighbors and the north.

The interviewer Walter Kemp is IPI’s Director of Europe and Central Asia and is based at IPI’s Vienna office.

Walter Kemp: You must be very busy these days since Cyprus has the presidency of the European Union. Can you tell us about some of the challenges of this task, especially for such a small country?

Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis: Assuming the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU is indeed a great challenge for Cyprus but also a great opportunity for any member state undertaking this obligation. I have to say that the Cypriot society as a whole has warmly endorsed this demanding task, with a sense of responsibility and pride for having the opportunity to contribute towards closer European integration.

Preparing for our presidency required hard work and determination. It took the mobilization of the entire civil service and the Cypriot society and a thorough preparation and cooperation with all the EU institutions. A large number of expert civil servants, technicians and organizational officers were needed to join their efforts in reaching our goal of a successful and credible presidency.

Fatou Bensouda, a Gambian lawyer, began her job as ICC’s Chief Prosecutor in June 2012, succeeding Luis Moreno Ocampo and becoming the second in that role since the Court’s inception in 2002. 

In this interview, Mrs. Bensouda discussed the relationship between the ICC and the UN Security Council. “We feel that the UN Security Council needs to do more to support the work of the court after having referred a case to it,” she said, adding that while one is a political body and the other is a judicial institution, both are working to address war crimes. “Because of this complex relationship, sometimes there are tensions.”

For example, the Security Council referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC in 2005, and in December 2012, seven years later, the ICC Chief Prosecutor will give his/her 16th report to the Security Council after its referral. The court has issued five arrest warrants in Sudan, including a warrant for its head of state, Omar al-Bashir. However, none of them have been arrested.

Mrs. Bensouda called for more proactive engagement, not only from the Security Council, but also from the 121 states parties to the Rome Statute, the Court’s founding treaty.

“The warrants, the orders, the rulings that the ICC makes should be implemented by the states. This is the system,” she added. 

On the continuing debate that frames peace and justice against each other, Mrs. Bensouda said, “I do not think that the excuse of saying, 'Let’s leave out justice so that we can attain peace’ should hold.” Mrs. Bensouda gave the example of LRA warlord Joseph Kony, who threatened to continue killing until the ICC drops the warrant for his arrest. Mrs. Bensouda argued that Joseph Kony killed people before the warrant, and continued his actions regardless. “Joseph Kony held this world at ransom for a long time,” she said.

When asked about justice in Syria, Mrs. Bensouda said that it is still possible for the ICC to investigate and prosecute war crimes there, but only if Syria or the Security Council grants the ICC jurisdiction to intervene.

Mrs. Bensouda also shared her vision for the ICC and reflected on the challenges that the ICC faces. Since taking office, Mrs. Bensouda said she has worked on an operations manual, placed a renewed focus on the prosecution of gender crimes, improved office dynamics, and strengthened the ICC’s relationship with the African Union (AU). 

In November 2011, Mrs. Bensouda interviewed with the Global Observatory as then-Deputy Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

The interview was conducted by Till Papenfuss, Policy Analyst at the International Peace Institute.

Listen to interview (or download mp3):

Till Papenfuss: We are here today, and it is my great pleasure to welcome back the now prosecutor of the ICC (International Criminal Court), Mrs. Fatou Bensouda.

About a year ago, we spoke here when you were still a candidate, and serving already for a long time as Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC. This was, indeed, just about six weeks prior to your election, and since then you have taken over the helm of the ICC. How has it been for you? What were the first steps you have taken since you took office, and did you change anything? How have these first months at the helm played out for you?