Analysis

Boko Haram has persistently defied all attempts by the Nigerian government to stop the violent spread of its activities from the northern part of the country, and sectarian violence and attacks have assumed new and dangerous dimensions in Africa’s most populous state. Nigerians are currently experiencing an era characterized by intensive military operations similar to those previously launched against Niger Delta militants, and an uncertain mood is prevailing which some have compared to the state of affairs during the Nigerian civil war.

Military regiments of the Joint Task Force (JTF) have been deployed across areas considered to be the country’s “geographies of terror,” from the cities of Maiduguri to Jos, and from Kano to Damaturu, the extent of which is reflected in unprecedented security expenditure figures rising to nearly a quarter of the national budget for 2012. In spite of these efforts, the first half of 2012 has seen a rise in the incidence of Boko Haram attacks. While armed action cannot be totally discounted, its utility as a single tactic has proved futile and has underscored the need for the Nigerian government to unify under a common goal and intensify its efforts at dialogue and mediation.

Key Conclusions:

The excessive militarization of some states in northern Nigeria has resulted in a tense martial atmosphere and a concomitant increase in cases of armed brutalization, civilian intimidation, and human rights violations by members of the Joint Task Force. This situation has inadvertently amplified the level of state-directed grievance among affected citizens, as well as an unfortunate provocation of local sympathies for Boko Haram’s cause. The predominant use of force by the Nigerian government is inherently problematic, and would only work successfully if there is a simultaneous application of other approaches such as mediation, particularly because of the dangerous permutation of ideological, political, and economic issues involved.

The degree to which mediation can be a useful tool in the Nigerian situation depends upon a number of complex factors suggested by analysts such as Jacob Bercovitch. These include: the nature of the issue, the mediators involved, the context, and the parties to the conflict.

Since the rainy season began in July, Niger has experienced its worst flooding in eighty years, affecting over 500,000 people. Niger, one of the poorest countries in the world, desperately needs international aid to help flood victims. But on September 8, Interior Minister Abdou Labo announced that some aid had been stolen.

This tragedy is yet another challenge for the new government, which has worked to promote transparency and unearth foul play. Authorities have created a hotline to report corruption and established a national anti-corruption body with representation from government, civil society, and private sector. But the fight has not gone smoothly. In July 2011, three months after President Mahamadou Issoufou took office, soldiers angry at firings and probes connected to the anti-corruption campaign plotted to assassinate him. In January of this year, arsonists targeted the Ministry of Justice, destroying key files used in the investigations. Critics even charge (French) that members of the president’s own entourage “have hastened to fill their pockets before packing up.”

Corruption is a problem across the Sahel. Out of 182 countries profiled in Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, Sahelian nations occupied some of the worst spots. On a list where the number one country, New Zealand, was the least corrupt, Sahelian countries ranked 100 (Burkina Faso), 112 (Senegal), 118 (Mali), 134 (Eritrea and Niger, tied), 143 (Mauritania and Nigeria, tied), 168 (Chad), and 177 (Sudan).

The problems caused by corruption are legion. Corruption among top politicians and officials drains millions of dollars from public treasuries. When Nigerian dictator General Sani Abacha died in 1998, for example, the Washington Post described his regime’s pervasive corruption in these terms:

The Haitian National Police (HNP) may be the best functioning state institution in Haiti and can therefore arguably be considered one of the few post-2004 crisis success stories. With support from the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), it grew from 3,500 in 2005 to just over 8,000 elements by 2010, and in spite of having been strongly affected by the January 2010 earthquake (the HNP headquarters was destroyed), it reached a strength of 10,000 in 2012. The HNP is now both visible and active, day and night, including in former gang strongholds of the capital’s slums, and its reputation has also improved with its capacities and professionalism.

Most importantly, the HNP remains the only national security force of Haiti (the army having not yet been formally reinstated–see below). And while it continues to rely heavily on the presence of MINUSTAH’s 12,000 international troops and police, its performance is likely to be a key determinant for the gradual handover and planned downsizing of MINUSTAH between now and the end of 2016. In this context, two major developments this past month merit our attention.

Key Conclusions

First, the mandate of longtime HNP director Mario Andresol (pictured above, left) ended on August 18 after serving two consecutive mandates since 2005. A new HNP director Godson Aurélus (pictured above, right) was appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Second, a new HNP development plan 2012-2016 was adopted by the Supreme Council of National Police (CSPN), which key objective is to bring the HNP from 10,000 up to at least 15,000 officers by 2016.

• The smooth transition of a new HNP director after seven years and the fact that the new HNP head came up through the ranks are encouraging signs;
• The tense political and security context in which this transition is taking place is, however, a source of concern as regard the risk of manipulation and politicization of the HNP;
• While the HNP may well be the best functioning state institution in Haiti, much work remains to be done, in particular to build a professional HNP middle and senior management;
• It may also be time to revisit the lessons from the first UN-supported attempt to build a professional Haitian police in the late 1990s;

Approximately 250,000 children are fighting as soldiers around the world, and scores are killed or injured in conflicts like the one happening in Syria right now. The recruitment and use of child soldiers, sexual violence, maiming, and killing are just some of the egregious crimes committed against children in conflict that members of the UN Security Council will have in mind today as they hold their annual Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict.

While the inclusion of this issue on the Security Council’s agenda in the last decade has been a vital step toward protecting children during conflict, the council could take specific steps today to address the many challenges that remain.

This was the view expressed by grassroots child protection organizations last Monday at an event co-organized by Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict and the International Peace Institute. Reflecting on the progress made thus far, these actors proposed that the Security Council strengthen the UN’s Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism and focus on fighting impunity.

The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM), which was formalized in 2005 by Security Council Resolution 1612, has had a fundamental importance in the field for local organizations as a structuring framework. Besides the implementation of action plans—concrete, time-bound commitments by parties to a conflict to halt violations of children’s rights, which are central to the MRM—this mechanism gave a strong framework under which local NGOs could strengthen their capacities, document in a consistent and systematic manner child rights’ violations, and structure local advocacy work while amplifying local voices at the global level.

Despite these advances, grassroots child protection actors agreed unanimously that shortcomings remain when it comes to addressing impunity and strengthening the accountability of armed actors. While demobilization of hundreds of child soldiers is an achievement, the risk remains that more will be recruited tomorrow if perpetrators of violations are not sanctioned for their wrongdoings. Yet, the reality is that, despite the many very positive aspects of the MRM, perpetrators are rarely brought to account for their crimes.

In a survey conducted by Thomson Reuters' TrustLaw Women, a hub of legal information and legal support for women's rights, India ranks with Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia as one of the most dangerous place for women. While women in India also face numerous disadvantages–poor health indicators, lower literacy rates, lower income levels, poor female-to-male ratio due to sex-selective abortions and female infanticide, to list a few–the last few years have witnessed some astonishing acts of violence against women in the country. Acts of violence registered against women in 2010 total to around 213,585. Swayam, a Kolkata-based NGO asserts that between 2005 and 2009, when the overall crime rate rose by 16%, the rate of crimes against women rose by 31%. This problem cannot be solved by the government alone but by a national awakening involving the entire country and civil society willing to stand up and defend the rights of its women and children.

In the aftermath of some high-profile acts of violence against women, the solutions put forth by law enforcement agencies tends towards restricting the movement of women, rather than taking action against the perpetrator or the culture that allows such acts to continue. At various times, officials have suggested that women should not work after 8PM, should not travel in the dark without a male escort, or be employed in jobs such as in bars. Somehow, the onus of not being attacked is placed on the victim, i.e., the woman, and one could suspect that sex crimes were being used as a pretext to infringe on the freedom of women.

Changing this culture of violence is a task that will take years. There are numerous steps that can be taken at the local, state and central levels, with concerted action on the part of the government, NGOs, local community leaders, healthcare professionals, religious and community elders, women’s and children’s rights groups. These are actions that can be taken immediately, and there are policies that can be put into place with just months of careful planning.

But these actions require political will that must cut across party lines and deal with this malady as a national security issue at the highest levels of government, both at the central and state levels. A recent letter signed by various prominent citizens and activists, was sent to the prime minister in May 2012. The letter drew his attention towards various actions suggested by government reports themselves that need to be enforced, including re-working how rape victims are examined, ensuring that the police are held accountable, as well as creating a dedicated 24-hour helpline for women. This letter lays out some very practical steps that can be taken immediately.

As armed groups strengthen their hold over northern Mali, the UN Security Council is set on September 17 to weigh a plan by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to support a Malian government offensive in the north. While the details of the plan remain unclear, Mali’s interim President Dioncounda Traoré has requested assistance from both ECOWAS and the UN in reforming and training the country’s army, as well as logistical assistance in a government offensive that could include ECOWAS troops to secure cities in the north. Army officers and politicians close to the leaders of the March 22 military coup have been openly critical towards the plan, particularly of the latter component.

Key Conclusions
A purely negotiated solution to the conflict in northern Mali is unrealistic; any strategy to address the conflict will need to include a military component. But the ECOWAS approach harbors major risks. The international community–which would have to back any ECOWAS mission in Mali financially and logistically–should focus its efforts on supporting the re-establishment of an effective Malian government and army. These efforts could suffer a serious setback as a result of the current ECOWAS plan, which is fuelling political tensions in the capital Bamako.

Secondly, ECOWAS is not the right regional framework to coordinate a response to the conflict in northern Mali. Neither Algeria nor Mauritania is a member of the bloc, and both are opposed to its approach. At the regional level, the key challenge is how to integrate Algeria into an international strategy to tackle the conflict.

Analysis
The current drive towards external military intervention is partly based on the assumption that northern Mali has fallen victim to external actors and dynamics outside its control. The conflict erupted, the story goes, when Tuareg fighters returned from Libya with heavy weapons and worsened when al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged as a key force, drawing on militants from across the region.

The crisis in the Sahel will not end unless new responses depart from the traditional “business-as-usual” approach. This was the key insight offered in a high-level roundtable held at IPI on September 7, 2011 and attended by ambassadors from Mali, Niger, Chad, Benin, Morocco, and Turkey, along with representatives from civil society organizations, academics, and experts from think tanks and research institutions, including the Mauritania-based Centre for Strategies and Security for the Sahel-Sahara Region. There were 55 participants in total.

Six key points emerged from the meeting:

1.    In Mali, the epicenter of a wider and deeper crisis in the Sahel, the economic nature of the armed groups in the north is increasingly visible. Initially considered as a response to the corrupt administration of former President Amadou Toumani Touré, the emergence of Islamists serves as cover for illicit trafficking of drugs, cigarettes, and migrants, thus facilitating the transfer of a considerable amount of foreign currency. Beyond Mali and the wider Sahel-Sahara region, trafficking is becoming a serious threat from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, contributing to the weakening of states and fueling political instability. To address these criminal aspects of the crisis in northern Mali and across the Sahel, a strict security approach should be complemented by principles of governance and the rule of law. Moreover, regional initiatives such as the West African Coast Initiative (WACI), which aims to fight drug trafficking by enhancing national and international coordination and by enabling investigations, should receive greater attention and support from countries in the region, as well as from the international community.

2.    The prospects for a negotiated settlement in Mali are presently unlikely. In Bamako, the current government institutions are too weak and the political elite and the security apparatus are too divided to be effective negotiating partners. They cannot put pressure on the rebels nor convincingly provide incentives to inspire the will to negotiate. In the north, the Islamist groups, including Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), represent a set of tactical alliances, rather than a cohesive opposition. Each group seems to be jockeying for territorial control in order to get a seat at the table when negotiations do come. As time is of the essence, suggestion was made for an alternative negotiation framework that could take over from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mediation process. Beyond the Malian actors and sub-regional leaders, such a new framework would involve  key players including Algeria, as well as other countries outside the region that are ready to help find a solution to the crisis.

At the start of every month, the Global Observatory posts a list of key upcoming meetings and events that have implications for global affairs.

Security

• September 10 – 28: Human Rights Council, 21st Session, Geneva, Switzerland
  During this 21st session of the Human Rights Council Syria will once again dominate the Council’s agenda as a key priority. At this session the commission of inquiry lead by Paulo Sergio Pinheiro and Karen AbuZayd will report on their findings over the last six months. This will be the final Human Rights Council session with the current membership. Elections are set to take place on November 12th at the UN General Assembly to elect new members to a three year term. Most groups have a clean slate except for WEOG where Germany, Sweden, Ireland, the United States, and Greece are competing for three slots.
• September 11-12: Commemorative Session and 4th Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Astana, Kazakhstan
  The commemorative session will celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), which was founded on the initiative of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev in 1992. CICA has 24 members, covering approximately three-quarters of the population and territory of Asia. Earlier this year, President Nazarbayev has called for a strengthening of the conference, transforming it into an international organization. These issues, including the question of succession in chairmanship, will certainly be discussed in Astana.
• September 17: Security Council meeting on Peace and Security in Africa (Sahel), New York 
  Council Members will discuss a proposed integrated strategy for security, governance, development, human rights, and humanitarian issues in the Sahel region. Council members had requested the Secretary-General to develop such a strategy in Security Council resolution 2056 on 5 July 2012. 

  The integrated strategy will need to consider the spillover risks of the Malian crisis in the region, and how to harmonize the seemingly diverse positions of the Malian authorities, core countries such as Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger, as well as the Economic Community of West African States. The leaders of the regional bloc are still considering a military intervention to ensure the effective return to constitutional order in Mali and to eradicate the terrorist threat in the northern part of the country.

• September 24: General Assembly High-level Meeting on the Rule of Law, New York
  In line with General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/102 of January 2012, there will be a high-level meeting debating the “rule of law at national and international levels.” Beyond member states delegations, expected speakers include the Secretary-General and senior representatives of relevant UN bodies as well as some NGO representative s from the rule of law field.