Analysis

When France’s President François Hollande flew to Timbuktu and Bamako on February 2 to supervise the ongoing Serval military operation, the crowds welcomed him as their savior, chanting his name and waving the French flags that had been widely distributed (some had even painted themselves blue, white, and red). The scene was reminiscent of Benghazi in September 2011 when Libyans cheered the arrival of then-French president Nicolas Sarkozy and UK Prime Minister David Cameron with signs that read, “Vive la France.” (Of course, Benghazi and Libya have now plunged into a security-political turmoil, and no one knows where it will lead.)

At the start of the engagement, French authorities were quick to announce that their troops would withdraw gradually from Mali in early March. However, unsurprisingly, the French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian has since revised France’s position, indicating that the military mission will take longer than expected. Now, it has been decided that French troops will remain in Mali alongside the deployment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), due to start on July 1. And a number of issues and security problems related to Mali and the Sahel region still remain.

Key Conclusions

• Conventional military operations cannot defeat terrorism and guerrilla warfare, and, on the contrary, may exacerbate the threat by providing more impetus to the terrorists who can in turn rally more support from the local populations. Indeed, civilian casualties often trigger anger among the populations who see no good in a foreign military intervention, as is the case in Iraq or Afghanistan.
• Mali’s allies and partners such as France have for a long time turned a blind eye to the internal problems of the country, and the economic aid pledged last week should only be part of a larger assistance plan involving political advice and training.
• Mali is the weakest link in a highly vulnerable Sahel region, which means that any lasting and concrete solution must have a regional and holistic approach.
• Military interventions can only be seen as a small part of a global political solution in Mali and the Sahel region in general. Mali and the Tuareg population suffer from decades-long socio-political and economic inefficiency, corruption, and a lack of willingness from Bamako to adequately respond to the legitimate demands of the Tuareg living in the north.

Analysis

The French military intervention may have helped to win back the cities of Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu, and the north of Mali, but, despite killing a large number of terrorists, most members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) have fled Mali and are now hiding in the grey zones of the vast Sahel region stretching from the Atlantic coast to the Red Sea. There are even growing indications that many have found safe haven in southern Libya as well as elsewhere in the contiguous southern areas.

Furthermore, the deaths of AQIM’s leader Abou Zeid and other terrorists, along with the presumed killing of Mokhtar Belmokhtar—the mastermind behind the dramatic attack on the In Amenas gas facility in Algeria in January—will not change the regional landscape instability. Indeed, AQIM’s tentacle body remains well alive, and terrorists who are fighting a typical asymmetrical guerrilla war will continue to hit-and-run either in Mali or in neighboring countries, just as they did in In Amenas. In fact, the recent coup attempt in N’Djamena could well be a response to Chad’s military involvement in Mali.

It is now three months since Hollande’s visit and his call for a dialogue to resolve the Malian crisis, and there remains legitimate doubts about Bamako’s willingness to find a genuine and durable socio-political solution to this ongoing deep-rooted crisis and engage into an open and sincere dialogue, even with the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). Further complicating this equation is that many believe that even if a political dialogue began, it could be a biased political disequilibrium favoring Bamako due to the French military involvement and influence.

Furthermore, it has been reported numerous times by human rights NGOs that the Malian army is taking revenge against the population in the north, especially against the Maures, Tuareg and Songhai. Similarly, the angry Malian population in the south perceives the Tuareg as those responsible for the current crisis in Mali, as well as behind the presence of the terrorists in the country. This can only widen the already dangerous divide between the north and south populations, and it is a serious issue the authorities must deal with quickly to prevent civilian chaos which would greatly undermine any possibility for stability and the unity of Mali.

From May 19-27, 2013, the African Union (AU) will hold its 21st summit in Addis Ababa. It will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) under the theme of “Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance.” It will also be almost ten years since the creation of the AU.

When the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addresses the assembled heads of states and governments and representatives of the AU Commission, he will likely praise the remarkable strides made by the African continent and the dynamic partnership between the UN and the AU to address peace and security challenges in Africa.

Yet, just as UN-AU collaboration seemed to have reached an all-time high, a recent AU Peace and Security Council communiqué revealed new tensions in the relationship. The communiqué expressed concerns about UN Security Council resolution 2100 which authorized the creation of the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA), stressing that it “…is not in consonance with the spirit of partnership that the AU and the United Nations have been striving to promote for many years.” This came just one month after another AU statement expressed support for the transformation of the African-led support mission in Mali, AFISMA, into a UN operation. What happened to change the AU’s position?

Key Conclusions

• The crisis in Mali has exposed important differences between the AU and the UN, stemming from divergent philosophies of peace operations and the Security Council’s decision not to follow the AU’s request for a UN-funded support package for AFISMA.
• Further sources of tension emerged as the UN operation was authorized by the Security Council. This meant that the AU’s requests concerning key personnel and a central political role may have been ignored, and the deployment of MINUSMA was made contingent on certain criteria.
• This situation once again revealed considerable mistrust between the two organizations, which must recognize that no amount of coordination mechanisms will completely prevent the political frictions that are bound to occur. 
• Nevertheless, as our recent report makes clear, the two organizations should continue to improve their bureaucratic interactions, and the AU should strengthen its capacity to articulate a timely, coherent, and effective voice in New York. 

Analysis

The crisis in Mali has exposed important differences between the African Union  and United Nations. In December 2012, UN Security Council resolution 2085 authorized an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). However, in light of the slow African response, and at the request of the Malian authorities, on January 11, 2013, France launched Opération Serval, a military intervention to stop the rebel advance and recapture major urban settlements in the north of Mali. Opération Serval created new facts on the ground, and AFISMA’s deployment timetable was accelerated from the originally planned date of September 2013. The subsequent deployment of African troops was supported by voluntary contributions made at an emergency donor conference on January 29, 2013, in Addis Ababa.

Shortly afterwards, in February, a joint UN-AU-ECOWAS planning conference in Bamako finalized the revised and harmonized AFISMA Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which was adopted in March 2013 with the mission strength set at nearly 9,450 uniformed personnel. The door was also opened for the creation of a UN peacekeeping operation in Mali, which would take over from AFISMA.

The international donor community is gathering in Brussels on May 15 to consider a request to pledge about 340 million euros ($439 million) in support of “a new Mali.” With significant progress made in constraining the presence and influence of armed groups in the north, it is crucial to focus on the provision of human security for all communities in Mali. It is essential for the political process to be sufficiently inclusive to address the multiple crises facing the country.

The donor conference should focus on six issues:

First, the “plan for the sustainable recovery of Mali,” as submitted by the Malian government to the donors, introduces many important programs to take care of the humanitarian crisis, rebuild the governance of Mali, and ensure the provision of social services. But why is the concept of human security absent in the presentation of these development efforts? The reduction of poverty and improvement of the well being of the Malian people in relation to greater freedom and participation are all elements in a comprehensive approach to strengthen human security, which is the key to undoing the conditions that helped violent extremism gain influence.

Second, the recovery plan of the government does not address how a process of dialogue and mediation can be organized in the coming months to reconcile different aspirations and build consensus between the south and the north, including in particular those communities whose sense of being neglected greatly contributed to the crisis. There can be no development or institution-building in Mali without conscious and designated relationship-building in society.

Third, elections in Mali should be rescheduled if no sufficient human security can be ensured across the country in the coming months. The aggressive occupation of northern Mali has disrupted the social infrastructure, made thousands flee their homes, and caused a significant humanitarian crisis. In the plans submitted to the donors, it is expected that elections will be held before July 31st. In reality, it is hard to imagine that it will be possible to have a voting system in place on the basis of biometric voter registration within the next 10 weeks. Elections are important, but bad elections in which a significant number of the Malian people cannot effectively participate—notably the communities most affected by the crisis—will be a disaster. It will move the country backward rather than forward on the road to recovery.

Along with the authorization of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on April 25, the UN Security Council authorized French troops to continue their military campaign in northern Mali, Opération Serval, in order to counter the threat of international terrorism emanating from the region. This is the latest indication that governments and multinational organizations such as NATO and the UN continue to believe a military presence can counter international terrorist threats. The so-called “war model” response to terrorism is familiar to global audiences, most starkly used by US President George W. Bush in his war against al-Qaeda, and is reinforced by terrorists who frequently characterize themselves as warriors and soldiers for their cause, engaged in a war against their targets.

Large-scale military responses to terrorism include campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, but is a military deployment the best response to a terrorist threat? Or can engaging in a war with terrorist actors be counterproductive?

Key Conclusions

• Protracted military campaigns do not reduce the threat of terrorism and can often exacerbate the threat by providing terrorist groups with media images of oppression, overwhelming lethal force, and cultural insensitivity. Civilian casualties inflicted by military campaigns can contribute to radicalization of the indigenous population, sympathy for terrorist causes, and grist for terrorist propaganda mills.
• Short-term and standalone military missions can, however, be effective in countering terrorism. A response of targeted, forceful operations can inflict lasting damage on terrorist networks, capabilities, and morale.
• Military intervention is a small part of counterterrorism strategy and should be used as a narrow and defined tool. Diplomatic, economic, social, and criminal justice models are essential for comprehensive counter terrorism policies and military units can be no substitute for these.
• The first phase of Opération Serval in Mali is assessed as having achieved its aims in the first ten days of deployment, but the mission must avoid the danger of being caught in what one expert calls “the quagmire,” where the aims become vague and there is no exit strategy.

Analysis

There has been a recent trend among Western governments and multinational organizations away from full-scale ground deployments as a means of countering international terrorism, and governments have sometimes chosen more limited, short-term action, such as the airstrikes in Libya. But capitals are also still entrenched in extended counterterrorism campaigns that have proved costly in lives, money, and reputations.

By deploying troops in the face of a terrorist threat, governments are responding to a public desire for action against terrorist actors. Political leaders appear decisive and able to regain the upper hand, often in the aftermath of, or threat of, an attack. However, the disadvantages of responding with force are many and well documented, and the action can often hinder broader counterterrorism initiatives. Indigenous populations can feel alienated, invaded, and colonized, and civilian casualties which accompany military engagements can have a radicalizing effect on populations, causing them to sympathize and collude with terrorist groups.

On April 18, the UN Security Council “underlined the need to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance through the most effective ways, including, where appropriate, across borders,” in a nonbinding oral statement. The statement followed a passionate plea to the Council by Valerie Amos, the Head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), to “consider alternative forms of aid delivery, including cross-border operations,” to access the most needy population in rebel-controlled areas of Syria.

These developments gave new impetus to an ongoing debate on whether aid can be channelled across borders directly in opposition-controlled areas despite Damascus’ lack of consent, or whether it should be channelled across frontlines with consent of the Assad regime. In practice, humanitarian organizations normally request state permission for access to territory. As previously explained in the Global Observatory, the centrality of state sovereignty and state consent in this debate is due to “the deeply state-centric nature of the legal and institutional framework regulating humanitarian assistance.”

From a purely legal perspective, however, arguments can be raised against an absolute condition of state consent for the delivery of humanitarian relief to areas not effectively controlled by state forces. International humanitarian law is not clear cut around this issue, but does provide legal arguments against a strict state consent requirement for humanitarian relief in internal armed conflict that can assist policy makers to heed the recent call of the Security Council.

Key Conclusions

• International humanitarian law stresses the obligation of parties to a conflict—state or nonstate actors—to allow and facilitate humanitarian assistance. As such, it does not require a strict consent by the state to the delivery of aid—with the exception of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions to which Syria is not a party—but focuses on the need of the civilian population.
• Parties to a conflict retain a right to control humanitarian assistance that allows them to prohibit access if it is used for other purposes than strictly humanitarian ones—such as to deliver military equipment. But it also implies that, in order to exercise this right, the concerned party has an effective control over the territory where the aid is transiting.
• In the case of Syria, a progressive interpretation of international law shows that Damascus’ consent is not a strict requirement to cross-border humanitarian assistance where the Assad regime has no control over the relevant border areas, on the condition that the aid is strictly humanitarian and impartial in nature.

More than a million customers around the world buy something at Walmart every hour. As they do, the retail giant collects data on their buying habits and adds it to a database containing the equivalent of 50 million four-door filing cabinets of text. Analyzing this torrent of data to understand and predict consumer behavior can be a profitable endeavor. Indeed, “big data” already helped Walmart’s US competitor Target to detect pregnancies by identifying changes in buying habits, so that it could adjust its marketing accordingly and increase sales dramatically.

For the private sector, big data is the next frontier in terms of creating value. But being able to understand when and why human behavior changes also offers huge potential for the public good, not least in the area of conflict prevention.

Right now, though, big data presents us with a new kind of digital divide—one that hinges on access to analytics rather than consumption of content. As large corporations leverage their own datasets and a number of governments release treasure troves of “public” data, poorer governments, civil society organizations, and multilateral bodies struggle to analyze big data for peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian ends. And conflict-prevention actors in particular may be getting left behind.

Key Conclusions

• The private sector has embraced big data analytics to drive innovation. Building on initiatives in the development and humanitarian fields, conflict-prevention actors should foster partnerships with corporations willing to share anonymized data and analytical expertise that could contribute to preventing violence and conflict.
• As governments increasingly embrace open-data policies, those seeking to better understand the structural causes of conflict should capitalize on already-public datasets.
• Public and private sector actors need to develop a framework for identifying the levels of trust, transparency, and control that citizens, corporations, and governments are willing to accept when it comes to sharing data in contexts of violence and conflict.

Analysis

Big data can offer insights into deep social, political, and economic trends as well as individual and group behavior. As previously outlined in this publication, it could therefore play a valuable role in both long-term efforts to address the root causes of conflict and short-term efforts to prevent outbreaks of violence. If plummeting wheat imports in Arab countries helped spark the Arab Spring, for example, or if phone call volumes increase before violence breaks out, then those seeking to prevent conflict need to draw on a much wider variety of data than before to make more informed decisions.

Two reports published last month make it clear that international actors, governments, and civil society organizations recognize big data’s potential in both conflict prevention and crisis response. But who has the data, and how can it be tapped?

At the start of every month, the Global Observatory posts a list of key upcoming meetings and events that have implications for global affairs.

Security

• May 8: Kurdish Rebels Withdraw From Turkey Under Peace Process 
  The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or P.K.K., has agreed to withdraw from Turkey as part of a peace agreement that will end more than three decades of conflict. The P.K.K. began waging war against Turkey  in the early 1980s to gain independence and establish a homeland. After months of quiet discussions between Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned founder of the P.K.K., and the Turkish government, an agreement was established, outlining the rebels’ withdrawal into northern Iraq in return for greater democratic rights for the Kurds under a new constitution and the release of Kurdish prisoners. Despite high hopes, however, analysts say the peace process remains fragile and at risk by opposing groups within the P.K.K. and Turkish nationalist circles. 
• May 20: China's Premier Li Keqiang to Visit India Amid Border Dispute 
  Chinese Premier Li Keqiang will visit India this month in his first official tour abroad after assuming office in March, and India's Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid is due to travel to Beijing on May 9 to lay the groundwork for the visit. However, both visits come at a time of rising tensions between the countries, as recently a platoon of Chinese troops set up posts in a disputed border region in the Himalayas, leading to a standoff. Several meetings between diplomats and army commanders from both sides have failed to defuse the situation, although both governments have said they’re willing to work together to deal with the issue. 
• May 21: IAEA holds 10th Round of Nuclear Talks With Iran 
  This month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran are expected to hold a new round of talks on resuming an investigation into Iran’s disputed nuclear program. Since early 2012, the IAEA has been trying to restart a long-stalled investigation into Iran’s nuclear facilities. Western powers have suspected Iran of developing the capability to build nuclear weapons, although Tehran denies the allegations, saying its atomic research is for peaceful purposes. Iran’s lack of openness with the IAEA and refusal to limit its nuclear activity has drawn crippling international sanctions. The IAEA-Iran talks, which will be the 10th between the two sides, are separate from the negotiations between Iran and the six world powers, but carry important weight.  

• Also of Interest:

  • May 16: European Cyber Security Summit 

Elections

• May 5: Parliamentary Elections in Malaysia 
  Malaysia’s upcoming general elections this month has become one of the most hotly-contested ever in its history. The stakes are high for both the ruling coalition and current prime minister Najib Razak’s Barisan Nasional (BN), and the opposition party, Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Pact), lead by Anwar Ibrahim. Strong economic growth and strict rules enabled the BN to hold onto power since Malaysia gained independence in 1957. However, fatigue with the ruling party has allowed the Pakatan to win a two-thirds majority in Parliament in 2008.

  Race-based policies that were introduced by the ruling coalition to favor ethnic Malays over the Chinese and Indian minorities have been contested by the opposition coalition, which has promised to address issues of corruption and fairness. They hope to tap into an increasing desire for greater political and economic reform and calls for change. Although the ruling coalition is expected to win with a reduced parliamentary majority, the anticipation of a close election that could cause uncertainty has negatively affected Malaysia’s markets, the third largest in Southeast Asia.   

After the prime ministers of Kosovo and Serbia initialed an agreement on April 19 concerning the normalization of their countries’ relations, reactions were highly euphoric. For a moment, it looked like both countries would be granted membership in the European Union (EU) almost overnight.

But just a day after Štefan Füle, the EU's European Commissioner for Enlargement, announced Kosovo and Serbia will now be granted the next step toward membership, Paris and Berlin put the brakes on, making it clear that only an implementation of the agreement could carry Serbia’s EU application any further.

What are the chances the EU-brokered deal can be turned into concrete results, and will local populations put aside their differences and follow their leaders? Are Serbia and Kosovo ripe for the EU, and does the club want them anyway?

Key Conclusions

• The recent agreement between Kosovo and Serbia is indeed a breakthrough after a long standstill, but it still dangles on a string, threatened by nationalist resentments on both sides.
• Any attempt to normalize the situation is doomed to fail as long as the parties don’t realize the need for compromise. In particular, the Serbian communities in North Kosovo need to realize that Kosovo’s self-proclaimed independence will not be reversed, and partition is not an option for the international community.
• Even though EU hesitance towards new members has grown, the governments of Kosovo and Serbia should still try to catch the momentum before their people become less willing to make concessions to maintain their EU perspective.
• Upon successful implementation of the new agreement, the work on outstanding issues (like the fight against organized crime and corruption; fostering rule of law and inclusion of minorities; or economic reforms) will require a lot of time and effort, and could warrant a rethinking of the international presence on the ground.

Analysis

Following a brutal inter-ethnic war between Albanians and Serbs, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 on June 10, 1999 that suspended Belgrade’s governance over its former province and established the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). Later, negotiations to settle Kosovo’s status led by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari failed, and ended with Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, which has so far been recognized by 99 of 193 UN member states.

The epicenter of tensions is in the northern part of Kosovo and its large ethnic Serb communities. While Serbia does not recognize the self-declared independence of Kosovo, the Serbs living in the north of Kosovo do not recognize Kosovo’s central authorities. On the contrary, they have created their own parallel institutions with support from Serbia. The city of Mitrovica, with its bridge over the Ibar river that links (or divides) the northern (Serbian) part from the southern (Kosovar) part is symbolic and often the scene of violence between the two ethnic groups.